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CLEAN POWER AND CHEVRON: SCORING THE FIGHT FOR 
OBAMA’S CLIMATE CHANGE RULE 
Leo Capoferri* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) proposed the 
Clean Power Plan (CPP) in June 2014, the response was mixed.  
Proponents viewed it as a sensible and realistic means of reducing 
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions produced by the energy sector.
1  
Many, however, were skeptical.  Opponents of the rule argued that it 
relied on a rarely used section of the Clean Air Act (CAA) to justify a 
radical expansion of EPA authority.2  Several states and industry 
participants have challenged both the proposed and final rule,3 and 
the Supreme Court of the United States recently took the 
unprecedented step of granting an immediate stay pending litigation.4 
The stakes are high for the EPA and the Obama administration.  
Facing recalcitrant opposition from a Republican-controlled Congress, 
President Barack Obama promised executive action on climate 
change5 and directed the EPA to limit CO2 emissions from existing 
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 1  See Tomas Carbonell & Megan Ceronsky, Section 111(d) and the Clean Power Plan: 
The Legal Foundation for Strong, Flexible, and Cost-Effective Carbon Pollution Standards for 
Existing Power Plants, 44 ENVTL. L. REP. 11086, 11090–91 (2014).  
 2  See Keith Goldberg, States, Industry Groups Launch Clean Power Plan Legal Fight, 
LAW360 (Oct. 23, 2015, 2:13 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/718094/states-
coal-groups-launch-clean-power-plan-legal-fight (according to West Virginia’s 
Attorney General “[t]he Clean Power Plan is one of the most far-reaching energy 
regulations in this nation’s history”).   
 3  See In re Murray Energy Corp., 788 F.3d 330 (D.C. Cir. 2015); See also Alan 
Neuhauser, Mess of Lawsuits Set to Challenge Clean Power Plan, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. 
(Oct. 23, 2015, 11:20 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/10/23/mess 
-of-lawsuits-set-to-challenge-clean-power-plan. 
 4  See Order in Pending Case, WEST VIRGINIA V. E.P.A., 577 U.S. 15A773 (2016), 
http://www.eenews.net/assets/2016/02/09/document_pm_03.pdf (last visited Jan. 
3, 2017) (order granting stay).  
 5  See John M. Broder & Richard W. Stevenson, Speech Gives Climate Goals Center 
Stage, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/22/us/politics/ 
climate-change-prominent-in-obamas-inaugural-address.html?_r=0/. 
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power plants.6  Given the remaining uncertainties and ongoing denial 
of the scientific underpinnings of anthropogenic climate change, 
executive action has the potential to alter the debate on mitigation 
policies, forcing the opposition to challenge the extent of carbon 
reduction rather than the policy itself.7  In addition, successful carbon 
mitigation policies bolster the United States’ credibility on the 
international stage as it continues to assume a leadership role in 
transnational efforts to address global warming.8  Indeed, many 
speculated whether the Supreme Court’s decision to stay the rule 
would undermine the historic Paris Agreement on climate change.9 
The CPP aims to reduce CO2 emissions from existing power plants 
by thirty-two percent from their 2005 levels by 2030.10  To achieve this 
goal, the CPP sets state-specific emissions standards tailored to each 
state’s present energy mix.11  The EPA calculated these standards to 
reflect the reductions that are achievable through the implementation 
of three “building blocks,” each of which describes a particular method 
of reducing CO2 emissions that the EPA has deemed feasible and cost-
effective.12  The building blocks provide for emissions reductions 
through increased efficiency, or heat rate improvements, (building 
block one) and the substitution of cleaner sources—natural gas and 
renewables such as wind and solar—for coal (building blocks two and 
three).13  Each state is responsible for devising and implementing a 
plan for meeting the CPP’s emissions standards, subject to EPA 
approval.14  If states fail to submit a plan, the EPA is authorized to 
 
 6  See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Announcing the 
Clean Power Plan (Aug. 3, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2015/08/03/remarks-president-announcing-clean-power-plan. 
 7  See Charlie Rose: President Obama’s Clean Power Plan with Gina McCarthy, Head of the 
Environmental Protection Agency (PBS television broadcast Aug. 2, 2015), 
http://www.charlierose.com/watch/60599780. 
 8  See id. 
 9  See Robinson Meyer, Did the Supreme Court Doom the Paris Climate Change Deal?, 
THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 12, 2016),  http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/ 
2016/02/the-parts-of-obamas-climate-legacy-that-will-survive/462294/. The Paris 
Agreement is a landmark deal that commits 195 nations to lowering CO2 emissions 
levels.  Coral Davenport, Nations Approve Landmark Climate Accord in Paris, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/13/world/europe/climate-
change-accord-paris.html.  International diplomats viewed the CPP as a crucial factor 
in the success of the negotiations.  Id.  
 10  See Fact Sheet: Overview of the Clean Power Plan, EPA, http://www2.epa.gov/clean 
powerplan/fact-sheet-overview-clean-power-plan (last visited Apr. 26, 2016).  
 11  See id. 
 12  See id. 
 13  See id. 
 14  See id.  
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substitute its own, which the states are obligated to implement.15 
The CPP has broad implications for the energy sector.  Due to the 
nature of greenhouse gasses (GHGs), meaningful emissions 
reductions cannot be achieved cost-effectively by measures 
implemented at each facility.16  The EPA attempts to solve this problem 
by identifying reductions that are achievable across the entire energy 
grid, and not merely as a result of improvements to individual power 
plants.  Consequently, building blocks two and three are emissions 
reduction measures that require actions “beyond the fenceline,” i.e. 
outside the physical boundaries of an affected power plant.  In order 
to meet emissions rates set by the CPP, power plant owners and 
operators will be forced to reduce generation from coal-fired facilities 
and substitute generation from natural gas and renewable sources.17  
The EPA estimates that the rule will reduce coal-fired generation by 
nearly fifty percent from current levels.18  Therefore, the CPP will 
restructure the nation’s energy supply, blurring the line between 
pollution reduction and energy regulation. 
In addition to the CPP’s negative implications for the coal 
industry, the required emissions reductions are considerably more 
stringent for some states compared with others, depending on the 
extent of their reliance on coal-fired power.19  For these reasons, the 
CPP has inspired vigorous opposition from states and industry 
participants. Twenty-seven states and “countless” industry participants 
are currently challenging the rule.20  Opponents of the CPP 
consistently rely on two arguments.21  First, they argue that a drafting 
 
 15  See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(2) (2012). See also id. 
 16  See Ann E. Carlson & Megan M Herzog, Symposium: Text In Context: The Fate of 
Emergent Climate Regulation After UARG and EME Homer, 39 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 23, 
29 (2015). 
 17  See Eric Anthony DeBellis, In Defense of the Clean Power Plan: Why Greenhouse Gas 
Regulation Under Clean Air Act Section 111(d) Need Not, and Should Not, Stop at the Fenceline, 
42 ECOLOGY L.Q. 235, 254 (2015). 
 18  See EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE CLEAN POWER PLAN FINAL RULE 
2–3, 3–24 (2015), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/ 
cpp-final-rule-ria.pdf.  
 19  See generally EPA, GOAL COMPUTATION TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT (2014), 
http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-06/documents/20140602tsd-goal-
computation.pdf.  
 20  Robin Bravender et al., The Fate of the Obama Administration’s Signature Climate 
Change Rule is in the Hands of the Courts, E & E PUB., http://www.eenews.net/interactive 
/clean_power_plan/fact_sheets/legal (last updated Feb. 19, 2016). 
 21  In addition, some opponents have argued that the CPP violates the 10th 
Amendment, a claim which has been described as “spurious.”  See Patrick Parenteau, 
The Clean Power Plan Will Survive: Part 2, LAW360 (Sept. 29, 2015, 10:15 AM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/704048/the-clean-power-plan-will-survive-part-2.  
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error—caused when two separate versions of § 111(d), one drafted by 
the House and one drafted by the Senate, were included in the 1990 
amendments to the CAA—should be resolved to preclude regulation 
of CO2 from existing power plants.
22  Second, opponents argue that the 
EPA lacks the authority to regulate beyond the fenceline.23  Because 
the EPA relies on § 111(d) as the source of its authority for the CPP, 
the first argument creates a threshold issue that a reviewing court will 
likely be forced to resolve.  The second argument is important because 
it encapsulates a powerful narrative that the EPA’s critics have 
employed, which describes the CPP as a sweeping and unprecedented 
expansion of the agency’s authority.24  Taken together, both arguments 
raise issues of first impression and will likely comprise the heart of the 
legal challenge to the CPP. 
Judicial review will hinge on the Supreme Court’s application of 
the Chevron doctrine,25 as both issues involve the EPA’s interpretation 
of the CAA.  Under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense 
Council, Inc., a court must defer to an agency’s reasonable 
interpretation of a statute if Congress’ intent is ambiguous.26  With 
regard to the drafting error, opponents of the CPP argue that the 
version of § 111(d) drafted by the House should govern and that it 
unambiguously precludes the regulation of CO2 from power plants,
27 
 
Moreover, some opponents have focused on the EPA’s § 111(b) rule, which is a 
statutory predicate of the CPP.  See Patrick Parenteau, The Clean Power Plan Will Survive 
Pt. 1, LAW360 (Sept. 28, 2015, 11:37 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/704046/ 
the-clean-power-plan-will-survive-part-1.  This Comment ignores these arguments.  
 22  See Coal Industry Application for Immediate Stay of Final Agency Action 
Pending Judicial Review at 6, Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 999 (2016) (No. 
15A778) [hereinafter Coal Industry Stay Application]; Application by 29 States and State 
Agencies for Immediate Stay of Final Agency Action During Pendency of Petitions for 
Review at 7–8, West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016) (No. 15A773) [hereinafter 
States’ Stay Application]; Application of Utility and Allied Parties for Immediate Stay of 
Final Agency Action Pending Appellate Review at 11, Basin Elec. Power Coop. v. EPA, 
136 S. Ct. 998 (2016) (No. 15A776) [hereinafter Utilities’ Stay Application]; Final 
Opening Brief of Petitioner at 15, In re Murray Energy Corp., 788 F.3d 330 (D.C. Cir. 
2015) (Nos. 14-1112, 14-1151) [hereinafter Murray Energy Petitioner’s Brief]; Eric 
Groten, Here Be Dragons: Legal Threats to EPA’s Proposed Existing Source Performance 
Standards for Electric Generating Units, 45 ENVTL. L. REP. 10116, 10120–21 (2015). 
 23  See Application of Business Associations for Immediate Stay of Final Agency 
Action Pending Appellate Review at 10–11, 16–17, West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 
(2016) (No. 15A773) [hereinafter Business Associations’ Stay Application]; States’ Stay 
Application, supra note 22, at 1–21; Utilities’ Stay Application, supra note 22, at 11–12; 
Groten, supra note 22, at 10122.  
 24  See, e.g., States’ Stay Application, supra note 22, at 15.  
 25  Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  
 26  Id. at 842–43.   
 27  See, e.g., Murray Energy Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 22, at 15–16. 
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whereas the EPA argues that the House version is ambiguous, but can 
be reasonably interpreted so as not to conflict with the Senate version, 
which does not prohibit the CPP.28  Consequently, a reviewing court 
will likely be forced to determine whether the House version is 
ambiguous under Chevron step one in order to resolve this issue.  The 
fenceline issue involves the EPA’s interpretation of the terms “best 
system of emission reduction” (BSER), which comprises the statutory 
basis for calculating the CPP’s emissions standards.29  Opponents 
challenge the EPA’s interpretation as being overly expansive, whereas 
the EPA argues that outside the fenceline measures are authorized 
under the plain meaning of the term “system,” as well as the legislative 
history and overall structure of the CAA.30  Resolving this issue will 
implicate Chevron to some degree.  Though the EPA argues that its 
interpretation is consistent with the plain meaning of the statute,31 the 
Court could very well invoke Chevron step two, as “system” is not 
defined within the CAA, and “best system of emission reduction” lacks 
a clear meaning.32  Alternatively, recent cases suggest the Court’s 
willingness to apply an exception to Chevron deference, known as the 
major questions canon, when determining issues of “vast economic 
and political significance.”33  Those challenging the CPP argue that the 
EPA’s interpretation of BSER is not entitled to deference due to the 
economic significance of the agency’s attempt to restructure the 
energy sector.34 
This Comment begins with a brief overview of the relevant 
portions of the CAA, as well as the Chevron doctrine and the major 
questions canon in Parts II and III, respectively.  Part IV summarizes 
the arguments on both sides of these two crucial issues, assesses their 
strengths and weaknesses, and concludes that the CPP ought to survive 
them.  In particular, the arguments in favor of reading § 111(d) to 
preclude the CPP are relatively weak, and under Chevron, a court 
should defer to the EPA’s interpretation.  Furthermore, interpreting § 
 
 28  Clean Power Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. 64712-15 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pt. 60) [hereinafter Final Rule]. 
 29  42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(a)1, (d)1 (2012); Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64723. 
 30  Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64758-62 
 31  See id. at 64758. 
 32  See Jody Freeman, Why I Worry About UARG, 39 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9, 13 
(2015); Carlson & Herzog, supra note 16, at 29. 
 33  Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014); See also King v. 
Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 
U.S. 120, 160 (2000). 
 34  See Utilities’ Stay Application, supra note 22, at 11; Business Associations’ Stay 
Application, supra note 23, at 10–11; Coal Industry Stay Application, supra note 22, at 3; 
States’ Stay Application, supra note 22, at 15. 
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111(d) to allow regulations beyond the fenceline is reasonable under 
Chevron step two.  Finally, the major questions canon should not be 
applied to invalidate the CPP.  The rule lacks a convincing rationale 
and the Court has not defined the criteria for administering it.  
Moreover, recent cases in which the doctrine was applied are 
distinguishable from the context of the CPP. 
II. STATUTORY BACKGROUND 
In order to implement the CPP, the EPA relies on its authority 
under § 111(d) of the CAA.  Section 111 was originally conceived as 
part of a “three-legged” approach to regulating air pollutants emitted 
from stationary sources.35  Accordingly, §§ 107-110 of the CAA address 
“criteria pollutants,” “the presence of which in the ambient air results 
from numerous or diverse mobile or stationary sources,” and which 
“may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”36  
In addition, § 112 establishes national emissions standards for a list of 
designated “hazardous air pollutants” (HAPs) emitted from particular 
types of sources.37  In light of these provisions, § 111 was originally 
conceived as a gap-filler that would cover emissions of non-criteria, 
non-HAP pollutants that the EPA determined caused or contributed 
to “air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger 
public health or welfare.”38  In particular, § 111(b) addresses emissions 
from new sources, while § 111(d) covers existing sources.39  Existing 
sources within a particular category are subject to § 111(d) only if new 
sources of the same category are already regulated under § 111(b). 
Section 111(d) authorizes regulations on a state-wide level.40  To 
accomplish this, the EPA establishes a “standard of performance for 
any existing source for any air pollutant.”41  The Act defines a “standard 
of performance” as “a standard for emissions of air pollutants which 
reflects the degree of emission limitation achievable through the 
application of the best system of emission reduction which . . . the 
Administrator determines has been adequately demonstrated.”42  
Thus, to establish a standard of performance, the EPA identifies the 
 
 35  Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64700. 
 36  42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)1 (2012). 
 37  42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2012). 
 38  42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(A) (2012); Robert R. Nordhaus & Avi Zevin, Historical 
Perpectives on § 111(d) of the Clean Air Act, 44 ENVTL. L. REP. 11095, 11097 (2014). 
 39  § 7411. 
 40  § 7411(d). 
 41  § 7411(d)(1).  
 42  § 7411(a)(1).  
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BSER for a given air pollutant and source category and the emission 
reduction that would result from the implementation of that system.43  
States are then required to develop a plan that would meet or exceed 
the emissions reductions achievable under the BSER.44  Under § 
111(d), states may choose the method of achieving emissions 
reductions, but if a state plan fails to provide for the implementation 
or enforcement of standards that meet EPA guidelines, the EPA has 
the authority to substitute its own plan.45  Because fossil-fuel fired 
power plants are a listed source category and greenhouse gases are not 
defined as a criteria or hazardous pollutant,46 the EPA is relying on § 
111(d) for authority to implement the CPP, including the methods for 
emissions reduction suggested by the three building blocks. 
III. CHEVRON 
In 1984, the Supreme Court issued its landmark ruling in Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council. At issue was the EPA’s 
interpretation of the term “stationary source” in the context of one of 
the CAA’s permitting requirements, which treated all of the pollution-
emitting devices within a single industrial facility as though they were 
encased in a single “bubble.”47  Meanwhile, the respondents argued 
that each individual pollution-emitting source constituted a discrete 
stationary source so long as it emitted over 100 tons of a pollutant.48  
To resolve this dispute, the majority announced the following rule: 
If the intent of Congress is clear. . . the court, as well as the 
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed 
intent of Congress.  If however, the court determines 
Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at 
issue . . . the question for the court is whether the agency’s 
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.49 
Applying this framework, the majority noted that because the 
relevant provision of the CAA did not contain a definition of stationary 
source, the term’s meaning was unclear.50  Next, the majority assessed 
the legislative history of the provision and found that it, too, was 
 
 43  See § 7411(a)(1), (d)(1); Carbonell & Ceronsky, supra note 1, at 11087–88. 
 44  See 42 U.S.C. §§  7411(a)(1), (d)(1). 
 45  See id. § 7411(d)(2)(A); Carbonell & Ceronsky, supra note 1, at 11087–88.   
 46  See §§ 7411(d)(1)(A)(i), 7412(b)(1); National Ambient Air Quality Standards, EPA 
(2016), https://www.epa.gov/criteria-air-pollutants/naaqs-table.  
 47  See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840 
(1984). 
 48  See id. at 859. 
 49  Id. at 842–43. 
 50  See id. at 860. 
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unhelpful in clarifying the meaning of the term.51  However, the 
majority did find that the legislative history clearly established the 
policy goals of the statute, and it upheld the EPA’s interpretation 
because the agency had reasonably concluded that the plant-wide 
definition of stationary source was consistent with the intended 
policy.52 
Chevron’s two-step framework is now considered “foundational,” as 
the “undisputed starting point for any assessment of the allocation of 
authority between federal courts and administrative agencies.”53  
Chevron’s central holding has been interpreted to mean that when a 
legal challenge involves an administrative agency’s interpretation of a 
statute, the reviewing court must determine whether Congress has 
unambiguously expressed its intent (step one).54  If not, the court must 
defer to any interpretation that is reasonable in light of the statute, its 
history, and the canons of statutory construction (step two).55  This 
approach resulted in a major transfer of interpretive authority to 
agencies.56  Prior to Chevron, judicial interpretation was the default 
rule.  Deference to administrative agencies required special 
justification, and the amount of deference was determined on a sliding 
scale.57  Thus, Chevron’s two-step framework was revolutionary—
because once a reviewing court finds an ambiguity, it must 
automatically give maximum deference to the agency and accept any 
reasonable interpretation.58 
The Chevron majority framed this rule in terms of an implicit 
 
 51  See id. at 862. 
 52  See id. at 863. 
 53  Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 188 (2006). 
 54  Chevron’s applicability may be limited according to certain “step zero” 
considerations, which are not discussed in this Comment.  See id at 207–22. 
 55  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845 (internal citations omitted) (“If this choice represents 
a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to the 
agency’s care by the statute, we should not disturb it unless it appears from the statute 
or its legislative history that the accommodation is not one that Congress would have 
sanctioned.”).  See also Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 
YALE L.J. 969, 977 (1992). 
 56  See Merrill, supra note 55, at 977.  The extent to which Chevron shifts the balance 
of interpretive authority away from courts is often limited in several ways.  First, the 
application of step one has been described as “erratic” with some courts finding 
ambiguity far less often than others.  See Case Comment, “How Clear Is Clear” In 
Chevron’s Step One?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1687, 1691–92 (2005).  Second, the Supreme 
Court has limited the contexts in which Chevron applies at all.  See Sunstein, supra note 
53.  This Comment discusses one of these limiting principles–the major questions 
canon.  
 57  See Merrill, supra note 55, at 977.  
 58  See id. 
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congressional delegation of authority to the executive.  That is, Chevron 
relies on the assumption that by conferring authority to administer a 
statute to an agency, Congress implicitly delegates interpretive 
authority.59  This rationale relies on a legal fiction, which assumes that 
a hypothetical reasonable legislator intended agencies rather than 
courts to resolve statutory ambiguities.60  The majority’s opinion in 
Chevron suggests two justifications for finding an implicit delegation.  
First, the majority notes that “the regulatory scheme is technical and 
complex” and suggests that Congress may have wanted agencies “with 
great expertise and charged with responsibility for administering the 
provision” to resolve any ambiguities.61  Second, the majority notes that 
agency interpretations involve policy choices, which are more 
appropriately left to agencies because they, unlike the judiciary, are 
democratically accountable.62 
The twin rationales for the Chevron framework inform the manner 
in which courts should apply the doctrine at step one.  The task of 
determining whether a statute is ambiguous requires courts to apply, 
explicitly or implicitly, some standard of clarity.63  In finding the 
appropriate standard, commentators have suggested that courts 
should be guided by the underlying justification for Chevron itself.64  
This makes sense, given that step one determines whether or not 
deference should apply.  If the underlying justifications for deference 
are present, then a court should be more willing to find statutory 
ambiguity than it otherwise would be.  Although courts may apply step 
one inconsistently in practice,65 this Comment will assume that political 
accountability and agency expertise count in favor of finding 
ambiguity for the purposes of its analysis. 
 
 59  See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (“[S]ometimes the legislative delegation to an 
agency . . . is implicit . . . .  In such a case, a court may not substitute its own 
construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the 
administrator of an agency.”); Merrill, supra note 55, at 995. 
 60  See Sunstein, supra note 53, at 200; Abigail R. Moncreiff, Reincarnating the “Major 
Questions” Exception to Chevron Deference as a Doctrine of Noninterference (Or Why 
Massachusetts v. EPA Got it Wrong), 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 593, 608–09 (2008).  This has 
been referred to as the “delegation” theory of Chevron, which appears to be the 
prevailing theory of the case amongst the Justices on the Supreme Court.  See Sunstein, 
supra note 53, at 198–99.  
 61  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. 
 62  See id. at 865–66; see also Sunstein, supra note 53, at 197. 
 63  See Case Comment, supra note 56, at 1698. 
 64  See id. at 1701–03. 
 65  See id. at 1691–92.   
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A. Chevron and the Major Questions Exception 
The implicit delegation rationale serves as the basis for the major 
questions canon, which has been invoked to invalidate agency 
interpretations that are analyzed under Chevron.  Commentators view 
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. as the first mature expression 
of the doctrine.66  At issue was the FDA’s interpretation of the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) to include tobacco products.67  
The majority rejected this interpretation, finding that it was 
inconsistent with the intent of Congress, as expressed via the FDCA’s 
“overall regulatory scheme” and subsequent legislation involving 
tobacco.68  More specifically, the majority found that the FDA’s 
interpretation was not consistent with the term “safety” as it was used 
throughout the FDCA.69  In addition, the majority determined that if 
tobacco products were subject to the FDCA, they would have to be 
banned according to the terms of the statute.70  Yet, the majority 
reasoned, Congress “has foreclosed the removal of tobacco products 
from the market,” insofar as it has “directly addressed the problem of 
tobacco and health through legislation on six occasions since 1965.”71  
The majority interpreted these enactments as a ratification of the 
FDA’s previous position that it lacked the jurisdiction to regulate 
tobacco,72 and it concluded that Congress clearly intended to preclude 
the FDA from regulating tobacco products.73 
Brown & Williamson is notable for the manner in which it deploys 
Chevron step one.  At the outset, the majority indicated that it was 
invalidating the FDA’s interpretation because it was inconsistent with 
the “unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”74  This would seem 
to be a straightforward application of the first step; yet, towards the end 
of the opinion, the majority again addressed Chevron, this time 
discussing its applicability in general, noting that “in extraordinary 
cases . . . there may be reason to hesitate before concluding that 
Congress has intended . . . an implicit delegation.”75  To support this 
proposition the majority cited a passage from an essay authored by 
 
 66  See Sunstein, supra note 53, at 240; Moncrieff, supra note 60, at 601. 
 67  See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125 (2000). 
 68  See id. 
 69  See id. at 160. 
 70  See id. at 137. 
 71  Id. 
 72  See id. at 156. 
 73  Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 161. 
 74  Id. at 125–26. 
 75  Id. at 159. 
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Justice Breyer in 1986, a time when Chevron’s scope remained a topic 
of debate.76  In that essay, then-Judge Breyer suggests the following: “A 
court may also ask whether the legal question is an important one.  
Congress is more likely to have focused upon, and answered, major 
questions, while leaving interstitial matters to answer themselves in the 
course of the statute’s daily administration.”77  On this basis, the 
majority concluded: “we are confident that Congress could not have 
intended to delegate a decision of such economic and political 
significance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion.”78 
Since Brown & Williamson, the Supreme Court has invoked the 
major questions canon on several occasions.  Most recently, in King v. 
Burwell, the Court denied deference to the IRS’ interpretation of the 
Affordable Care Act.  That case involved an interpretation governing 
tax credits for individuals who purchased health care on a federal 
exchange, as opposed to an exchange established by one of the states.79  
Rather than apply Chevron, the majority held that because the tax 
credits involved “billions of dollars in spending each year” and affected 
“the price of health insurance for millions of people,” the interpretive 
issue was a “question of deep economic and political significance.”80  
Consequently, the majority concluded that it was “especially unlikely 
that Congress would have delegated this decision to the IRS, which has 
no expertise in crafting health insurance policy of this sort.”81 
In another recent case, Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA (UARG), 
the majority stressed that the major questions canon was appropriate 
in the context of an expansion of agency authority that would have vast 
economic and political significance.  In that case, the majority 
invalidated an EPA interpretation of the CAA’s permitting 
requirements as applied to GHG emissions.  The majority was 
concerned that forcing stationary sources to acquire permits on the 
basis of GHG emissions would result in an absurd expansion of the 
number of sources that would be subject to the program.82  Specifically, 
it noted that under the EPA’s interpretation, the agency could require 
permits for “the construction and modification of tens of thousands, 
and the operation of millions, of small sources nationwide.”83  
 
 76  See Sunstein, supra note 53, at 199. 
 77  Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159. 
 78  Id. at 160. 
 79  King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2485 (2015). 
 80  Id. at 2489.  
 81  Id. 
 82  See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2428 (2014). 
 83  Id. at 2444. 
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Consequently, citing Brown & Williamson, it concluded that the EPA’s 
interpretation was unreasonable within the framework of Chevron step 
two because it would result in “an enormous and transformative 
expansion in EPA’s regulatory authority without clear congressional 
authorization.”84 
Taken together, these cases illustrate several important features 
of the major questions canon.  First, it appears to function as a broad 
exception to Chevron.  In Brown & Williamson, the majority discussed 
the economic and political significance of the FDA’s interpretation 
after it had concluded that the statute was unambiguous under Chevron 
step one.85  In UARG, the majority invoked the major questions canon 
at step two, as a basis for concluding that the EPA’s interpretation was 
unreasonable.86  Finally, in King, the majority never embarks on a 
Chevron analysis and simply announces that the framework does not 
apply.87  Consequently, the doctrine is not confined to any particular 
“step,” but operates as a mechanism for denying deference on issues 
deemed sufficiently important. 
But it is unclear why courts should assume interpretive authority 
over major questions.  As several commentators have observed, the 
major questions canon lacks a persuasive justification in light of the 
two widely accepted justifications for Chevron—technical expertise and 
political accountability.88  If, as Chevron suggests, courts should defer to 
agencies because they possess more technical expertise than judges 
and because policy decisions are best determined by politically 
accountable branches of government, then Chevron should apply to 
 
 84  Id. 
 85  See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000). 
 86  See Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2444 (“EPA’s interpretation is also 
unreasonable because . . . .”). 
 87  See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488–89.  There is debate as to whether the major 
questions canon should be interpreted as a discrete exception to Chevron.  Some argue 
that Brown & Williamson should be interpreted as a Chevron step one case, with the 
implication being that “political and economic significance” is only relevant insofar as 
it suggests that Congress’ intent is unambiguous.  See Sunstein, supra note 53, at 247.  
Others interpret the major questions canon as a broad exception to Chevron.  See 
Moncrieff, supra note 60, at 603.  The difference may be more theoretical than 
practical.  Under both analyses, an agency will not be entitled to deference when a 
reviewing court determines that a dispute involves a “major question,” either because 
the statute is unambiguous or because Chevron does not apply. See Case Comment, 
supra note 55 (interpreting Brown & Williamson as a step one case and suggesting that 
courts adjust the standard of clarity at step one to deny deference to agencies when 
addressing a major question).  In either case, the same fundamental problem of 
administering the doctrine remains, as there does not appear to be a metric for 
determining what constitutes a major question. 
 88  See Sunstein, supra note 53, at 242–44; Moncrieff, supra note 60, at 606–16.   
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economically and politically significant issues as well.  In King, the 
majority indicates that it is concerned with technical expertise, and its 
rationale for invoking the major questions canon is that the IRS is the 
wrong agency for determining health care policy.89  But in UARG, the 
majority suggests a different rationale, which is that courts should 
assume interpretive authority when an agency attempts to enlarge its 
own jurisdiction.90  But conceptualizing the major questions canon in 
terms of a rule against agency self-aggrandizement also lacks a 
compelling justification in light of Chevron.  This is because agency 
interpretations that result in broader authority also involve technical 
expertise and political accountability.  Thus, assuming that an agency’s 
rulemaking was motivated purely out of a bad faith desire for increased 
power, it would still be subject to political forces that would force it to 
develop “compelling technical and political reasons for [its] 
decisions.”91 
Another problem with the major questions canon is that there is 
no criterion for administering the doctrine.  In each major questions 
case, the Court simply relies on the phrase “economic and political 
significance” without explaining where the line is drawn.  For instance, 
the King majority cites the fact that the ACA tax credits constituted 
“billions of dollars in spending” and affected “millions of people.92  But 
what if it only involved millions in spending and affected thousands of 
people, would the major questions canon still apply?  The Court leaves 
this question unanswered.93  Moreover, the apparent source of the 
doctrine, Justice Breyer’s essay, also fails to address the issue.94  Breyer 
himself has indicated that he viewed “majorness” as one of several 
factors that would determine how much deference a court would 
apply.95 
 
 89  See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489. 
 90  See Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2444.  
 91  See Moncrieff, supra note 60, at 614 (arguing against a self-aggrandizing 
justification for the major questions canon).  
 92  King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489.  
 93  See Sunstein, supra note 53, at 243 (arguing that the major questions doctrine 
should not be applied as an exception to Chevron because there is no way to administer 
the distinction between interstitial and major questions and because agency expertise 
and political accountability are relevant to the resolution of major questions); 
Moncrieff, supra note 60, at 621 (noting that the major questions exception lacks “a 
workable rationale”).  
 94  See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 363, 370–71 (1984). 
 95  Moncrieff, supra note 60, at 611 n.72. 
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IV. LEGAL CHALLENGES 
This Comment addresses two arguments that are likely to figure 
prominently in the legal challenge against the CPP.  First, a reviewing 
court will be forced to answer the threshold question of whether § 112 
precludes regulation of existing sources under § 111(d).  This will 
require judicial review of a longstanding drafting error, which will be 
an issue of first impression.96  Second, recent decisions involving EPA 
interpretations of the CAA suggest that the “fenceline” issue will play a 
major role in a challenge before the Supreme Court, as at least four 
Justices have expressed concern over the breadth of EPA’s statutory 
authority to regulate air pollutants.97  In addition, the EPA’s asserted 
authority to regulate beyond the fenceline constitutes the central 
premise of the CPP as well as an unprecedented expansion of 
regulatory power with respect to air pollution and GHG’s in particular.  
Consequently, the resolution of this issue will likely have a lasting 
impact on future EPA action under the CAA. 
A. The Drafting Error Argument 
In 1990, Congress amended the CAA and passed two different, 
potentially conflicting versions of § 111(d).98  Prior to the 1990 
amendments, § 111(d)(1) applied to “any air pollutant for which air 
quality criteria have not been issued or which is not included on a list 
published under section 108(a) or 112(b)(1)(A).”99  Consistent with § 
111(d)’s role as a gap-filler for pollutants that were not covered by the 
criteria pollutant and HAP programs, this language was interpreted to 
exclude three categories of air pollutants: those for which air quality 
criteria have not been issued, those listed in § 108(a), and those listed 
in § 112(b)(1)(A).100  In amending this provision in 1990, the Senate 
merely updated the cross-reference to reflect changes to § 112, 
substituting “§ 112” for “§ 112(b)(1)(A).”101  Meanwhile the House 
version contains the language that currently appears in the U.S. 
Code:102 “for any air pollutant for which air quality criteria have not 
been issued or which is not included on a list published under [§ 
 
 96  See Nordhaus & Zevin, supra note 38, at 11095.  
 97  See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014); EPA v. EME Homer 
City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 
(2007). 
 98  See Nordhaus & Zevin, supra note 38, at 11098. 
 99  Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604,  § 111(d)(1)(A), 81 Stat. 
485, 1684 (1970). 
 100  See Nordhaus & Zevin, supra note 38, at 11100. 
 101  See id. at 11098. 
 102  The Senate version is included in the Statutes at Large.   
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108(a)] of this title or emitted from a source category which is regulated under 
[§ 112] of this title.”103 
Opponents of the CPP argue that the House version precludes 
the EPA from regulating CO2 emissions from power plants under § 
111(d).  On this view, the language of the House version is 
unambiguous, and by its plain meaning, § 111(d)(1) explicitly 
excludes pollutants regulated under § 108(a) as well as any air 
pollutant emitted from a source category regulated under § 112.104  
Opponents also argue that this interpretation is consistent with the 
1990 amendments, which revised § 112 to authorize regulations 
according to source categories rather than pollutants.105  As a result of 
this change, opponents contend that § 111(d)(1) was similarly 
amended to exclude § 112 source categories rather than pollutants, so 
as to avoid subjecting existing sources to simultaneous national and 
state-wide standards under §§  112 and 111(d), respectively.106  Because 
§ 112 authorizes the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards, which apply to 
power plants, this reading of the House version would invalidate the 
CPP.107 
In addition, proponents of this view argue that Congress never 
intended to pass the Senate version of § 111(d).  In the absence of any 
legislative history clarifying the intended scope of the § 111(d) 
exception,108 opponents of the CPP rely on the textual structure of the 
1990 amendments.  Accordingly, they note that the House version 
appears among several substantive changes to the Act, whereas the 
Senate version is included among a list of “clerical” changes under the 
heading “Conforming Amendments.”109  The Senate Legislative 
Drafting Manual stipulates that conforming amendments are 
“necessitated by the substantive amendments or provisions of the 
 
 103  42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 104  See Murray Energy Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 22, at 15–18; Final Brief of the States 
of West Virginia, Alabama, Alaska, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Nebraska, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Wyoming as Intervenors in Support of the 
Petitioner at 4, 6–12, In re Murray Energy Corp., 788 F.3d 330 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Nos. 
14-1112, 14-1151) [hereinafter Murray Energy States’ Brief].   
 105  See, e.g., Coal Industry Stay Application, supra note 22, at 13–15. 
 106  See, e.g., id. 
 107  See Nordhaus & Zevin, supra note 38, at 11098. 
 108  See id. at 11103 (“[T]here is no obvious congressional purpose undergirding the 
dueling amendments.  There are no floor statements or committee reports that 
directly answer the question of what Congress intended when amending § 111(d) in 
the 1990 CAA.”). 
 109  See Murray Energy States’ Brief, supra note 104, at 7–8; Murray Energy Petitioner’s 
Brief, supra note 22, at 30–31. 
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bill.”110  Thus, the Senate version, which replaces “112(b)(1)(A)” with 
“112(b),”111 corresponds with the need to update the cross-reference to 
§ 112 in light of substantive amendments made to that section.112  Yet, 
the House version also replaces this cross-reference, substituting 
“112(b)(1)(A)” with “or emitted from a source category which is 
regulated under section 112.”113  In light of this conflict, opponents of 
the CPP argue that the Drafters intended to pass the House version 
because a conforming amendment would never be intended to qualify 
a substantive amendment.114  Consequently, they argue that the Senate 
version was included in the final draft of the amendments by mistake 
and should not be given effect.115 
Alternatively, opponents also argue that even if a court were to 
consider the Senate version, it should give effect to both provisions and 
interpret them to exclude—in addition to criteria pollutants—both 
any HAP emitted from any source and any air pollutant emitted from 
a source category regulated under § 112.116  Opponents contend that 
principles of statutory construction require a court to give maximum 
effect to the language in each provision and that, therefore, this 
reading constitutes the only permissible interpretation of both 
provisions.117  Moreover, proponents argue that because the 1990 
amendments expanded the scope of § 112, this interpretation is 
consistent with the overall structure of the Act insofar as it narrows the 
gap covered by § 111(d).118 
Unsurprisingly, the EPA rejects both of these arguments and takes 
 
 110  United States Senate, Office of the Legislative Counsel, Legislative Drafting 
Manual § 126(b)(2)(A) (1997).  
 111  Clean Air Act, Amendments, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 302(a), 104 Stat. 2399 
(1990); see Murray Energy Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 22, at 30–31.  
 112  See Murray Energy States’ Brief, supra note 105, at 9. 
 113  Clean Air Act, Amendments, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 108, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990). 
 114  See Murray Energy Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 22, at 33.  The entity responsible 
for preparing the U.S. Code, the House Office of the Law Revision Counsel, resolved 
this conflict by applying the amendments in the order in which they appear.  See id. at 
30–31 (noting that Congress and the House Office of the Law Revision Counsel have 
established a rule whereby an amendment will not be included in the U.S. Code if “a 
prior amendment in the same bill removes or alters the text that the subsequent 
amendment would amend”).  Accordingly, because the cross-reference to § 112 had 
already been deleted by operation of the prior amendment containing the House 
version, the Senate version “could not be executed” and was not included in the U.S. 
Code.  See id. (quoting the Office’s amendment note).  
 115  See Murray Energy States’ Brief, supra note 105, at 9–11. 
 116  See id. at 14–15. 
 117  See id. at 13. 
 118  See Groten, supra note 22, at 10121 (noting that Congress completely rewrote § 
112, adding a list of 188 HAPs to regulate).  
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the position that § 111(d) authorizes the regulation of CO2 from power 
plants.  Instead, the agency gives effect to both versions of the 1990 
amendments, and construes them as having the same meaning within 
the context of the CPP.119  Accordingly, the EPA argues that the Senate 
version is clear and unambiguous, and that its plain meaning excludes 
regulation of the pollutants listed in § 112.120  With regard to the House 
version, the EPA argues that the language is ambiguous, and that in 
light of the CAA’s history and structure, the only reasonable 
interpretation is that it excludes air pollutants listed in § 112 that are 
also emitted from source categories regulated under § 112.121  On this 
reading, the § 111(d) exclusion does not preclude the CPP because 
CO2 is not a HAP subject to § 112.
122 
Whereas opponents of the CPP assume that the House version’s 
language is clear, the EPA’s position suggests that it should be entitled 
to deference under Chevron step two.123  To support this view, the EPA 
argues that the House version is susceptible to numerous 
interpretations.124  To illustrate, recall that § 111(d)(1) provides as 
follows: 
The Administrator shall prescribe regulations . . . under 
which each State shall submit to the Administrator a plan 
which establishes standards of performance for any existing 
source for any air pollutant [clause 1] for which air quality 
criteria have not been issued or [clause 2] which is not 
included on a list published under [§ 108(a)] of this title or 
[clause 3] emitted from a source category which is regulated 
under [§ 112] of this title.125 
Opponents of the CPP read the three clauses as simultaneous 
requirements, such that § 111(d) only applies to air pollutants that 
meet all three conditions.  This reading imputes a conjunctive 
relationship between the three clauses, effectively replacing each “or” 
with an “and.”  Yet, as the EPA and others have noted,126 the disjunctive 
“or” that connects each clause supports a literal interpretation that 
allows the EPA to regulate any air pollutant when either air quality 
criteria have not been established for that pollutant, or the pollutant 
 
 119  See Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64715. 
 120  See id. at 64712.  This interpretation is not in dispute. 
 121  See id. at 64714–15. 
 122  See 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2012). 
 123  See Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64712. 
 124  See id. at 64713. 
 125  42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1) (2012) (numbering added). 
 126  See Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64713; Nordhaus & Zevin, supra note 38, at 
11105. 
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is either not listed in § 108(a) or not emitted from a source category 
listed in § 112.  On this reading, § 111(d) would authorize the EPA to 
regulate any air pollutant for which air quality criteria have not been 
issued, regardless of whether it is subject to regulation under § 112.127 
The plain text of the House version also supports an 
interpretation that expressly authorizes the regulation of air pollutants 
that are emitted from a source category that is subject to § 112.  Unlike 
the first two clauses, which are stated in the negative (“for which air 
quality criteria have not been issued . . . which is not on a list published 
under [§ 108(a)]”), the third clause is stated in the positive.  
Opponents of the CPP rely on an interpretation of the House version 
that implicitly repeats the negative from clause two, reading clause 
three as “which is not emitted from a source category which is regulated 
under § 112,” to conclude that § 111(d) prohibits rather than 
authorizes the regulation of pollutants emitted from § 112 source 
categories. But as the EPA points out, this interpretation relies on a 
presumption, not the plain text of the House version.128 
Because the plain text of the House version supports multiple 
readings, the EPA argues that it is ambiguous.129  Thus, in anticipation 
of Chevron step two, the EPA advances an interpretation that does not 
preclude the CPP, which the agency argues is reasonable in light of § 
111(d)’s purpose as a gap-filler covering non-criteria, non-HAP 
pollutants.  The EPA’s definition diverges from the plain text of the 
House version in the same manner as its opponents’ interpretation, 
construing the three clauses as conjunctives, and reading a negative 
“which is not” in to the third clause.130  However, unlike its opponents, 
the EPA does not read the qualifying clause “emitted from a source 
category which is regulated under [§ 112]” as a broad exclusion of 
source categories listed under § 112 regardless of the pollutant subject 
to regulation under § 111(d).131  Instead, the EPA argues that 
“regulated under [§ 112]” only refers to HAP emissions.132  Therefore, 
 
 127  See Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64713.  Because air quality criteria have not been 
issued for CO2, this interpretation would not preclude the CPP.  See id.  Nevertheless, 
the EPA rejects this interpretation as unreasonable because it would undermine § 
111(d)’s historical purpose as a gap-filler by eliminating the relationship between § 
111(d) and § 112 altogether.  See id.  
 128  See Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64713.  The EPA also rejects this interpretation 
as unreasonable because it would allow for the regulation of HAPs that are already 
subject to § 112 regulations.  See id.  
 129  Id. at 64712–14. 
 130  See id. at 64714. 
 131  See id. 
 132  See id. 
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when “regulated under [§ 112]” modifies “source categories,”133  it 
means that source categories listed under § 112 are excluded when the 
pollutant subject to § 111(d) regulation is also a HAP listed in § 112.134  
In this manner, the EPA reads the House version as a similar, but more 
narrow exclusion than the Senate version.  Whereas the Senate version 
excludes pollutants that are listed under § 112, the EPA argues that the 
House version should be read to exclude § 112 pollutants emitted from 
§ 112 source categories.135 
The EPA argues that this reading is reasonable because it is 
consistent with the structure of the Act and Congress’s intent.  First, 
the EPA notes that because “emitted from a source category which is 
regulated under [§ 112]” modifies “any air pollutant,” it makes more 
sense to interpret the clause as an exclusion of pollutants rather than 
source categories.136  Second, the EPA argues that its interpretation is 
consistent with the structure of the CAA because it does not leave a 
regulatory gap for harmful pollutants that are not regulated under the 
criteria or HAP programs.137  By contrast, the alternative interpretation 
adopted by the opponents of the CPP would prevent the EPA from 
regulating harmful non-criteria, non-HAP pollutants emitted from a 
source category that is subject to regulation under § 112.138  But, the 
EPA argues, there is no evidence to suggest that Congress intended to 
narrow § 111(d) coverage when it passed the 1990 amendments.139  
Finally, because the EPA recognizes both versions of § 111(d), it argues 
that its interpretation of the House version is reasonable because it is 
consistent with the Senate version.140 
B. Resolving the Drafting Error Argument 
Ultimately, because the dispute involves an agency’s 
interpretation of a statute, the drafting error issue hinges on a court’s 
application of Chevron.  If a reviewing court determines that Congress 
did not intend to pass the Senate amendment to § 111(d), it will still 
have to determine whether the House version is ambiguous, as the EPA 
argues.  Otherwise, a court may determine that it must give effect to 
 
 133  42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2012). 
 134  See Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64713–14.  
 135  See id. at 64714.  
 136  See id. at 64715. 
 137  See id. 
 138  See Memorandum for the Federal Respondents in Opposition at 26, West 
Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016) (No. 15A773) (noting that § 112 lists 140 source 
categories). 
 139  See Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64715. 
 140  See id. 
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both versions.141  In this event, opponents of the CPP argue that the 
Senate version should be ‘added’ to their interpretation of the House 
version to create a broader exclusion that combines the two provisions.  
On the other hand, the EPA argues that the two versions are consistent 
with one another.  Consequently, to address each side’s arguments, a 
reviewing court will have to resolve the meaning of the House version 
regardless of whether it decides to give effect to the Senate version. 
1. The House Amendment is Ambiguous 
A reviewing court should find that the House version of § 111(d) 
is ambiguous.  First, as the EPA points out, the most natural reading of 
the text does not make sense in light of the statute’s purpose as a gap-
filler.  Because the natural reading of the word “or” results in a series 
of disjunctive conditions, the text of the House amendment suggests 
that § 111(d) applies to any pollutant for which air quality criteria have 
not been established or which is either not listed in § 108(a) or not 
emitted from a source category listed in § 112.  Yet this construction 
conflicts with the purpose of the exclusion, as both sides agree that § 
111(d) was intended to cover the regulatory gaps between §§ 108 and 
112 without overlapping with those programs.142  If “or” is allowed to 
have its natural meaning, then the House version of § 111(d) would 
allow overlapping regulations of pollutants covered by § 108(a) (if 
either air quality criteria have not been established, or if the pollutant 
is not emitted by a § 112 source category), as well as pollutants emitted 
from a source category listed in § 112 (if either air quality criteria have 
not been established, or if the pollutant is not listed in § 108(a)). 
In addition to finding textual evidence of ambiguity, a court 
should also analyze the step one issue in terms of institutional choice.  
In this regard, the court must consider whether it makes sense to 
assume that a rational legislator would have intended the EPA to have 
interpretive authority over the CAA.  Of course, Chevron itself answers 
this question to some extent.  As the Court recognized in that case, the 
EPA should be entitled to deference when interpreting a complex 
 
 141  See Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191 (2014).  A majority applied 
Chevron to a statute that contained two conflicting provisions, and three Justices 
concluded that in cases of direct conflict, Chevron does not apply.  Id.  To the extent 
that a court interprets the House and Senate amendments as being in direct conflict, 
Scialabba suggests that Chevron would apply to an interpretation that gives effect to 
both.  Id.  Nevertheless, as the EPA’s argument demonstrates, the two provisions are 
not necessarily in conflict, depending on how the House version is interpreted. 
 142  See Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64715; Murray Energy Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 
22, at 21–29.  
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statute within its area of expertise.143  More specifically, the Court has 
already recognized the EPA as an “expert agency” with regard to the 
regulation of greenhouse gas emissions.144  Moreover, although the 
EPA is an independent agency,145 the CPP is clearly an example of 
executive branch policymaking, in that it was promulgated at the 
president’s request.  Thus, the EPA’s attendant interpretations of the 
CAA reflect policy choices that were made by a politically accountable 
branch of government.  On the bases of agency expertise and political 
accountability, a reviewing court’s standard of clarity should be 
relatively stringent, in favor of deference.  Therefore, given the textual 
difficulties inherent in the House version of § 111(d), as well as the 
rationale for deference under Chevron, a reviewing court should 
conclude that § 111(d) is ambiguous and analyze the EPA’s 
interpretation under Chevron step two. 
Alternatively, it is possible that a reviewing court will apply Chevron 
in a manner that recognizes the dueling amendments at the outset, 
rather than proceeding to analyze the House amendment for 
ambiguity first.  In this case, the analysis at step one is more 
straightforward: the mere fact that the 1990 amendments included two 
potentially conflicting versions of the same statutory text is itself 
sufficient evidence that Congress failed to speak clearly on the issue.  
Thus, by giving effect to the Senate version, a reviewing court should 
recognize that the inconsistencies between the two versions create 
ambiguity. 
This possibility presupposes a court’s willingness to recognize the 
Senate version, something to which the CPP’s opponents strenuously 
object.146  But, it is settled law that when the two conflict, the Statutes 
at Large take precedence over the U.S. Code.147  Moreover, opponents 
of the CPP have no basis for assuming that the Senate did not intend 
to pass their version of § 111(d) simply because it inserted the updated 
cross-reference as a conforming amendment following the House 
version.148  Consequently, there is no reason why a court should ignore 
 
 143  Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 
(1984). 
 144  See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 428 (2011). 
 145  Case Comment, supra note 56, at 1701 (noting Justice Kagan’s position that less 
deference should be accorded for independent agencies on the political 
accountability justification of the Chevron doctrine).  
 146  See discussion supra notes 108–15.  
 147  See United States v. Welden, 377 U.S. 95, 98 n.4 (1964) (quoting Stephan v. 
United States, 319 U.S. 423, 426 (1943)) (“[T]he Code cannot prevail over the Statutes 
at Large when the two are inconsistent.”). 
 148  See Nordhaus & Zevin, supra note 38, at 11100. 
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the Senate version. 
2. The EPA’s Interpretation of the House Amendment is 
Reasonable 
Assuming a reviewing court gets to step two, it should find that 
the EPA’s interpretation of the House amendment to § 111(d) is 
reasonable.  First, the agency’s reading is faithful to the exclusion’s pre-
1990 purpose.  That is, unlike the competing interpretation, which 
would create a wholesale exclusion for specific source categories, it 
would limit § 111(d)’s applicability to non-criteria and non-HAP 
pollutants.  Thus, the EPA’s interpretation avoids creating a new 
regulatory gap with regard to non-criteria, non-HAP pollutants when 
they are emitted from source categories listed under § 112.  Second, 
this reading reconciles the House and Senate versions and avoids 
creating a conflict within the statute.  In this regard, the EPA’s 
interpretation is consistent with the canons of statutory construction.149 
Assuming a reviewing court agrees with this analysis, it will affirm 
the statutory predicate for the CAA, allowing the EPA to regulate CO2 
emissions from power plants under § 111(d).  Nevertheless, having 
cleared this threshold issue, the rule faces a second compelling 
challenge—this time, against the scope of the EPA’s statutory authority 
to regulate CO2 emissions under § 111(d). 
C. The Fenceline Issue 
In order to implement building blocks two and three and regulate 
beyond the fenceline, the EPA relies on an interpretation of “standard 
of performance” that encompasses the entire energy grid, rather than 
each individual power-generating facility.150  According to § 111(a), a 
standard of performance “reflects the degree of emission limitation 
achievable through the application of the best system of emission 
reduction.”151  Because the Act does not define “system,” the EPA has 
adopted an interpretation based on the plain meaning of the term, 
defining it as “a set of things or parts forming a complex whole.”152  
Accordingly, the EPA defines “system of emission reduction” as “a set 
of measures that work together to reduce emissions.”153 
 
 149  See Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191, 2217 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting) (internal citations omitted) (noting that the Court has a duty “to fit, if 
possible, all parts of a statute into a harmonious whole”). 
 150  Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64762. 
 151  42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (2012). 
 152  Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64762. 
 153  Id. 
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In addition, under § 111(d)(1), a standard of performance 
applies for “any existing source.”154  Section 111(a) defines an existing 
source as any existing “building, structure, facility, or installation which 
emits or may emit any air pollutant.”155  For the purposes of the CPP, 
the EPA interprets “source” to include the owners and operators of any 
“building, structure, facility, or installation for which a standard of 
performance is applicable.”156  Consequently, the EPA interprets a 
“system of emission reduction” as a series of measures that power plant 
owners and operators may implement to meet the emissions limits set 
by the CPP.157 
The immediate consequence of the EPA’s interpretation of § 111 
is that the CPP’s emissions standards are not limited by what is 
achievable through on-site improvements.  As a result, the EPA’s 
calculation of achievable emissions reductions anticipates measures 
outside of the fenceline, such as investments in renewable energy and 
natural gas and purchases of emissions credits.158  In fact, the EPA 
concedes that no pollution control technique or process can be 
installed at an existing coal-fired plant to achieve the CPP’s emissions 
standards.159  Thus, the CPP will essentially force a reduction in fossil-
fuel-fired power and transform the nation’s energy mix, reducing the 
amount of coal-fired power from forty-one percent of the nation’s 
energy supply to twenty-seven percent by 2030, with natural gas and 
renewables making up the difference.160 
Opponents of the CPP argue that the EPA lacks the authority to 
regulate beyond the fenceline for two reasons.  First, they argue that 
the language and structure of § 111 unambiguously precludes the 
EPA’s interpretation.  Second, opponents argue that because of the 
scope of the mandated reductions in coal-fired power output, the CPP 
invokes a major question of vast “economic and political significance” 
without clear authorization from Congress.161 
The first argument focuses on the EPA’s conflation of sources 
with their owners and operators.  Section 111 defines the term “owner 
or operator” separately from “existing source” and “stationary 
 
 154  § 7411(d)(1). 
 155  See §§ 7411(a)(3), (6).  
 156  Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64762. 
 157  See id. 
 158  Id. at 64726. 
 159  Utilities’ Stay Application, supra note 22, at 6. 
 160  See id. at 7.  
 161  Business Associations’ Stay Application, supra note 23, at 16–17.  
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source.”162  Moreover, § 111(d) explicitly authorizes performance 
standards “for any existing source,” making no mention of a source’s 
owners or operators.163  The Act further distinguishes between sources 
and their owners and operators in § 111(e), which provides that “it 
shall be unlawful for any owner or operator of any new source to 
operate such source in violation of any standard of performance 
applicable to such source.”164  Thus, opponents of the CPP argue that 
the EPA’s interpretation conflicts with the unambiguous meaning of 
the statute because Congress intended to classify sources and their 
owners and operators separately, by providing those terms with distinct 
meanings and addressing each separately in various provisions of § 
111.165 
The second argument against the EPA’s attempts to regulate 
beyond the fenceline invokes the “major questions” canon.  
Challengers assert that the CPP constitutes a radical and 
unprecedented expansion of the EPA’s authority into an area where it 
lacks expertise, transforming the agency into an energy regulator 
intent on reconfiguring the nation’s energy supply.166  Consequently, 
invoking King and UARG, they argue that the CPP involves a major 
question of economic and political significance, and that the EPA has 
acted without a clear Congressional mandate, thereby overstepping 
the bounds of its authority under § 111.167 
For its part, the EPA maintains that Congress did speak clearly 
when it authorized the agency to determine the “best system of 
emission reduction” for existing sources.168  According to the EPA, the 
expansive plain meaning of “system” encompasses the beyond-the-
fenceline measures implicated in building blocks two and three.169  
Furthermore, the EPA maintains that its interpretation is reasonable 
because on-site improvements would either be too expensive or 
ineffective in curbing CO2 emissions.
170  Finally, the EPA points out that 
power plants already rely on generation-shifting and other off-site 
 
 162  See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(5) (2012) (defining “owner or operator” as “any person 
who owns, leases, operates, controls, or supervises a stationary source”).  
 163  § 7411(d). 
 164  § 7411(e). 
 165  See, e.g., Business Associations’ Stay Application, supra note 23, at 9–11. 
 166  See id. at 16–18. 
 167  See id. 
 168  See Memorandum for the Federal Respondents in Opposition, supra note 138, 
at 34.  
 169  See id. at 35.  The EPA adopts the dictionary definition of “system,” as a “set of 
connected things or parts forming a complex whole.”  Id.  
 170  See id. at 37–38. 
CAPOFERRI (DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/2017  9:31 PM 
2017] COMMENT 677 
measures to comply with existing CAA regulations that regulate 
beyond the fenceline.171 
In addition, the EPA argues that it is reasonable to include owners 
and operators within the definition of “source” out of practical 
necessity.  This is because pollution control strategies must always be 
carried out by a plant’s owner or operator, regardless of whether they 
occur within the boundaries of the physical plant.172  Thus, the agency 
argues, just like any other pollution-control efforts, generation-shifting 
measures must be implemented by owners and operators of the 
affected source. 
D. Resolving the Fenceline Issue 
Once again, both of the arguments marshalled by challengers to 
the CPP against the EPA’s authority to regulate beyond the fenceline 
implicate the Chevron doctrine.  The textual argument against 
conflating sources with their owners or operators implicitly relies on 
Chevron step one, because it asserts that the EPA’s interpretation is 
contrary to the unambiguous meaning of § 111.  Similarly, by invoking 
the major questions canon and the EPA’s lack of expertise in energy 
regulation, opponents of the CPP seek to disqualify an interpretation 
of § 111 that would allow measures implemented outside of the 
physical boundaries of an affected power plant.173  Curiously, unlike its 
response to the drafting error argument, the EPA does not explicitly 
argue that the relevant provisions of the Act are ambiguous.174  This 
suggests that the EPA is staking its claim at Chevron step one and 
implicitly asserting that building blocks two and three are consistent 
with the unambiguous meaning of the Act.  It is possible that a 
reviewing court will accept this view and resolve the fenceline issue at 
step one; however, the scope of “best system of emission reduction” has 
never been analyzed under Chevron.175  It is not inconceivable that a 
 
 171  See id. at 40 (referring to the acid rain program implemented as part of the 1990 
amendments to the CAA).  The acid rain program contemplated generation-shifting 
and emissions credits trading.  See also Legal Memorandum Accompanying Clean 
Power Plan for Certain Issues, 88–91; Memorandum for the Federal Respondents in 
Opposition, supra note 138, at 43 (referring to sulfur emissions standards promulgated 
under § 111(b), for which the EPA determined that the “best system” would take into 
account third-party off-site fuel cleaning).  
 172  See Memorandum for the Federal Respondents in Opposition, supra note 138, 
at 44 (internal citations omitted) (arguing that “buildings, structures, facilities, and 
installations, obviously are incapable of taking such steps on their own”).  
 173  See Business Associations’ Stay Application, supra note 23, at 16–17. 
 174  See Memorandum for the Federal Respondents in Opposition, supra note 138, 
at 34–38.  
 175  See Freeman, supra note 32, at 12. 
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court will find the term ambiguous and analyze the fenceline issue 
under Chevron step two.176  If this were to happen, the EPA might still 
lose a legal challenge despite being able to demonstrate the 
reasonableness of its interpretations, if challengers can convince the 
court that building blocks two and three raise a “major question” of 
economic and political significance without clear Congressional 
authorization. 
1. The Plain Meaning of “Best System of Emission 
Reduction” Permits Regulating Beyond the Fenceline 
Within the context of § 111, the meaning of “best system” is less 
nebulous than it appears on its own.  For instance, the Act provides 
that the EPA must evaluate the costs, non-air-pollution-related health 
and environmental impacts, and energy requirements of any proposed 
emissions standard to determine whether it is “best.”177  Moreover, § 
111(a)(1) stipulates that the “best system” must be “adequately 
demonstrated” and “achievable.”178 
Within this framework, emissions reduction strategies such as 
generation-shifting and emissions credit trading make sense for a 
number of reasons.  First, the CPP’s emissions targets meet the 
statutory criteria for “best.”  Greater reliance on natural gas and 
renewables will not have a net negative impact on public health or the 
environment.179  In addition, the EPA concluded that limiting the 
performance standard to what is achievable through on-site 
improvements would either be too costly or ineffective.180  By 
regulating beyond the fenceline, the EPA aims to reduce the energy 
sector’s CO2 emissions by sixteen percent, at a cost that does not 
exceed prior rules promulgated for power plants under the Act.181  In 
addition, the EPA determined that there was sufficient unused natural 
gas and renewable generation capacity, such that generation-shifting 
 
 176   See id. at 13 (noting that a reviewing court might find “best system” ambiguous); 
Carlson & Herzog, supra note 16, at 35 (predicting that a reviewing court will analyze 
the fenceline issue at step two). 
 177  See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (2012) (“[T]aking into account the cost of achieving 
such reduction and any nonair quality health and environmental impact and energy 
requirements.”).   
 178  Id. 
 179  See Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64721 (noting that the D.C. Circuit has 
interpreted “best” to mean that a rule must not do more harm than good in terms of 
public health and the environment); id. at 64751 (concluding that no combination of 
the building blocks will result in negative non-air health and environmental impacts).  
 180  See id. at 64751. 
 181  See Memorandum for the Federal Respondents in Opposition, supra note 138, 
at 39. 
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would not negatively impact the energy supply.182  Second, the EPA 
found that the displacement of coal and other fossil fuels in favor of 
natural gas and renewables was “achievable” in light of the available 
capacity and prevailing trend towards greater reliance on natural gas 
and renewables within the industry.183  Finally, the EPA concluded that 
building blocks two and three are “adequately demonstrated” because 
power plants currently have the capacity to invest in alternative fuel 
sources in order to reduce emissions,184 if they do not do so already.185  
Thus, a court should find that the pollution-reduction measures 
anticipated by the three building blocks are authorized under the 
plain meaning of “best system of emission reduction,” as that term is 
used in § 111. 
In addition, the conflation of sources with their owners and 
operators does not violate the meaning of § 111.  Instead, the EPA has 
merely recognized the practical reality that inanimate “stationary 
sources”—as that term is defined in § 111(a)—are incapable of actually 
implementing any type of pollution control measure themselves, 
whether it be inside or outside the fenceline.  Thus, although 
challengers are correct to note the manner in which the statute 
distinguishes “owners and operators” and “source,” their argument is 
ultimately specious; any emissions standard promulgated under § 111 
necessarily relies on actions taken by source owners and operators for 
compliance.  This is why § 111(e) holds owners and operators 
responsible for implementing the standards formulated under § 
111(d). 
2. Building Blocks Two and Three Are Reasonable in Light 
of Congressional Intent and Past Rulemaking 
Assuming that a court finds the phrase “best system of emission 
reduction” ambiguous, it should affirm building blocks two and three 
because they are consistent with congressional intent and prior 
regulations under the Act.  When Congress amended the CAA in 1977, 
 
 182  See id. at 38. 
 183  See id. at 38–39.  
 184  See Essex Chem. Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427, 433 (D.C. Cir. 1973) 
(defining an “adequately demonstrated system” as one that can “reasonably be 
expected to serve the interests of pollution control without becoming exorbitantly 
costly in an economic or environmental way”); Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64746–47 
(describing how power plant owners can invest in natural gas burning and renewable 
sources to offset CO2 emissions from fossil-fuel burning sites). 
 185  See Memorandum for the Federal Respondents in Opposition, supra note 138, 
at 40 (noting that some state programs already rely on generation shifting to reduce 
CO2 emissions).  
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it explicitly recognized that regulations promulgated under § 111 
would impact the energy sector.186  This trend has continued, as the 
1990 amendments added the HAPs provisions to the CAA, imposing 
emissions standards on both new and existing electric generating 
units.187  Congress therefore anticipated that pollution reduction 
would affect energy production when it drafted the CAA. 
Moreover, Congress has previously authorized beyond the 
fenceline measures within the CAA.  To address acid rain, the 1990 
amendments established a cap-and-trade program for sulfur dioxide 
emissions from fossil fuel-fired sources and encouraged substitution of 
renewable sources.188  When it revised § 111(a)(1) in 1977, Congress 
specifically provided that the precursor to the phrase “best system of 
emission reduction”189 should be broad enough to permit the EPA to 
require fuel treatment that was typically conducted offsite by third 
parties.190  Although Congress updated § 111(a)(1) in 1990, it 
expanded the definition of “standards of performance.”191  
Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that Congress intends § 
111(d) standards of performance to allow beyond the fenceline 
measures, including acts by third parties. 
Finally, the Supreme Court has also acknowledged the 
reasonableness of certain beyond the fenceline measures in the air 
pollution context.  In E.P.A. v. EME Homer, the Supreme Court recently 
affirmed the EPA’s interpretation of the Transport Rule—a provision 
of the CAA that regulates “downwind” emissions between states—
 
 186  See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting that the 
Senate and House Reports indicated that Congress was using “a long-term lens with a 
broad focus on . . . environmental and energy effects of different technological systems 
when it discussed section 111”).  The focus on the energy impacts of pollution control 
was also apparent in the 1977 amendments to the criteria pollutant program, which 
shares the same federal-state implementation framework as § 111.  See 42 U.S.C. § 
7409(d)(2) (2012) (providing for the appointment of an “independent scientific 
review committee” to, inter alia, advise on the “energy effects which may result from 
various strategies for attainment and maintenance of such national ambient air quality 
standards”). 
 187  See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b), (d)(2)-(3) (2012). 
 188  See 42 U.S.C. § 7651(b) (2012). 
 189  The 1977 amendments defined “standard of performance” in terms of a 
“technological system of continuous emission reduction.”  See Final Rule, supra note 28, 
at 64765–66.  The pre-1977 language (“best system of emission reduction”) was 
restored pursuant to the 1990 amendments.  Id.  
 190  See H.R. Rep. No. 95-294, at 188 (1977). 
 191  See Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64701–02 (explaining the distinction between 
“technological system of continuous emission reduction” and “best system of emission 
reduction”).  
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which provided for an emissions credit trading system.192  Applying 
Chevron, a six-Justice majority found that the CAA’s Transport Rule 
failed to specify how the EPA should divide responsibility for 
nonattainment of emissions standards in downwind states between 
multiple upwind polluters.193  The majority deferred to the EPA’s 
solution, which it found efficient and equitable, and therefore 
reasonable.194 
In light of the history of the CAA and past rulemakings, a 
reviewing court should not find the EPA’s interpretation of § 111 
unreasonable merely because it calls for outside the fenceline 
measures or relies on the actions of third parties.  Nevertheless, at this 
stage of the analysis, the reasonableness of the EPA’s interpretation of 
“best system of emission reduction” remains an open question, as the 
major questions canon looms as a general exception to deference that 
can be invoked at step one or two. 
3. The Fenceline Issue Does Not Raise a Major Question of 
Economic and Political Significance 
Even if a court decides that it is reasonable to interpret § 111(d) 
as authorizing regulations that rely on actions taken outside the 
fenceline, it could still invalidate the CPP on the grounds that the 
extent of the mandated displacement of fossil fuel-fired power is 
sufficient to raise a “major question.”  However, the problem with any 
analysis of a potential “major question” is that no court has ever 
explained where the line is drawn, in terms of economic and political 
significance, between so-called “major questions” and reasonable 
interpretation.  Yet if precedent is any guide, the CPP should not be 
considered a major question.  In Brown & Williamson, the Court 
decided that a ban on all tobacco products was sufficiently “major.”195  
The major question in Burwell involved billions of dollars and affected 
the health insurance policies of millions of Americans.196  Finally, in 
UARG, the Court invoked the doctrine to invalidate an interpretation 
that would have brought millions of new sources under the Title V 
permitting program, placing a huge administrative burden on both the 
EPA and businesses that are not typically considered sources of air 
pollution.197  The CPP is clearly distinguishable from each of these 
 
 192  See EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1597 n.10 (2014). 
 193  See id. at 1604. 
 194  See id. at 1607. 
 195  FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000). 
 196  King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015).  
 197  Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014). 
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situations.  First, the Rule predominantly impacts a small sector of the 
U.S. economy, the coal industry.  Unlike Burwell, other than reducing 
air pollution, the CPP will not make a noticeable difference in the lives 
of the vast majority of Americans.198  Second, unlike Brown & 
Williamson, the regulation does not result in a total ban on any product 
or process; it simply incentivizes a reduction in coal power.  Third, 
building blocks two and three really only apply to fossil-fuel fired power 
plants, a substantially smaller number of sources nationwide than was 
at issue in UARG.199  Finally, it is likely that the energy sector would have 
responded to the CPP by substituting natural gas and renewables for 
fossil fuel sources even if those measures had not been suggested in 
building blocks two and three.  This is because the mandated 
reductions in fossil-fuel-fired power are consistent with industry trends 
favoring increased reliance on natural gas and renewable energy,200 
and because displacement of fossil fuels represents the most cost-
effective means of achieving reductions in CO2.  Thus, it is difficult to 
conclude that the CPP represents a major disruption of the energy 
sector, as many challengers suggest. 
Moreover, to the extent that CPP does meet the criteria for a 
“major question,” as the preceding analysis outlines, there is strong 
evidence that § 111(d) represents clear Congressional authorization 
for the offsite measures contemplated by the CPP.  This is because the 
history of the Act, the legislative record, past rulemakings, and even 
past instances of deference to the EPA all point to the fact that the 
CAA, and § 111 in particular, authorizes beyond the fenceline 
measures, at least to some degree.  In this respect, the situation is the 
complete opposite as that of Brown & Williamson, in which Congress 
had repeatedly acted under the assumption that the FDA could not 
regulate tobacco products. 
Challengers’ arguments also fail with regard to the issue of agency 
expertise.  The Court has repeatedly indicated that it views the EPA as 
 
 198  The EPA studied the possible consequences for energy availability, reliability, 
and price, and concluded that the CPP would not have a negative effect on consumers.  
See Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64663. 
 199  See EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE CLEAN POWER PLAN FINAL RULE 
2–7 (2015), http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/cpp-
final-rule-ria.pdf (indicating that there are only 1257 coal-fired power plants in service 
nationwide). 
 200  See Memorandum for the Federal Respondents in Opposition, supra note 138, 
at 39 (noting that coal-fired electricity fell from fifty percent to thirty-nine percent of 
total energy production between 2004 and 2014, while over the same period the 
reliance on natural gas and renewables increased from eighteen percent to twenty-
seven percent and nine percent to fourteen percent, respectively).  
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an expert agency with regard to the CAA and air pollution.201  Although 
opponents of the CPP argue that the EPA is overstepping its authority 
and deputizing itself as an energy regulator, they fail to address the fact 
that Congress acknowledged the relationship between air pollution 
controls and the energy industry when it drafted other provisions of 
the CAA.  Thus, the argument that the major questions canon should 
be invoked to deny deference to the EPA because it lacks sufficient 
expertise to administer the CPP is unpersuasive. 
V. CONCLUSION 
No discussion of the imminent legal challenge to the CPP can 
afford to ignore the exigencies of the moment.  When the final rule 
was published, many thought that the rule’s fate would likely rest in 
the hands of Justice Kennedy, as the swing vote in a 5-4 decision.202  
Perhaps no one expected that the Court would grant a stay, much less 
that Justice Scalia would pass away within weeks of that unprecedented 
decision.  At the time the stay was granted, headlines suggested that 
the CPP was in serious trouble,203 although no one could say exactly 
why; the Court’s stay order contained no reasoning, but simply 
indicated that the four “liberal” Justices had voted against it.  Now, 
following Scalia’s demise, there is a chance that the political 
obfuscation surrounding the nomination process will have the ironic 
effect of ensuring that the Court cannot strike the rule.204  Right now, 
litigation is proceeding on an expedited schedule, and the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit will hear 
the case in early June.205  If Republicans prevent an Obama nominee 
from reaching the bench, there is a chance that an evenly divided 
Supreme Court will decide the challenge.  Thus, there is a possibility 
that the same Republican obstructionism that bore the rule may 
ensure that it survives. 
As for the actual legal analysis of the case, this Comment has 
 
 201  Chevron itself being an example of the Court’s willingness to defer to the EPA’s 
interpretations of the CAA.  See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 427 
(2011) (identifying the EPA as an “expert agency” with regard to the administration 
of the CAA). 
 202  See John Siciliano, Justice Kennedy Will Decide the EPA Climate Plan’s Fate, WASH. 
EXAMINER (OCT. 30, 2015, 7:50 PM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/justice-
kennedy-will-decide-the-epa-climate-plans-fate/article/2575374. 
 203  See Coral Davenport, Supreme Court’s Blow to Emissions Efforts May Imperil Paris 
Climate Accord, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/11/us/ 
politics/carbon-emissions-paris-climate-accord.html. 
 204  See Robin Bravender, Scalia’s Death ‘Puts All the Action’ in D.C. Circuit, E&E PUB. 
(Feb. 19, 2016), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060032665. 
 205  See id. 
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outlined two issues of first impression that constitute the bulk of 
challengers’ arguments against the rule.  As the preceding analysis 
suggests, the EPA can adduce persuasive arguments in its favor.  
Accordingly, the CPP should not be precluded by the House version 
of § 111(d), regardless of whether a court decides to give effect to the 
Senate version.  In addition, § 111(d) should be interpreted to allow 
generation-shifting as well as other measures taken beyond the 
fenceline, as such measures are generally recognized by all three 
branches of government as viable, efficient means of reducing air 
pollution.  Finally, the CPP does not warrant invalidation under the 
major questions canon because it is not sufficiently disruptive in light 
of precedent, because it is consistent with Congress’ vision of the CAA, 
and because the EPA is the expert agency tasked with regulating air 
pollution pursuant to the Act.  For these reasons, a reviewing court, 
namely the D.C. Circuit Court, should uphold the rule. 
 
